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PUBLICLY-TRADED LLCs:
THE NEW KID ON THE EXCHANGE
Mary Siegel*
HE rise of LLCs as the business association of choice is well docu-
mented.' Created to provide a business model that combines free-
dom of contract, limited liability, and tax choice,2 LLCs have
soared in popularity, far outpacing the creation of corporations or part-
nerships, both nationally3 and in Delaware. 4 Noteworthy in the LLC field
is Delaware's departure from the Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act (ULLCA) 5 in one critical respect: the ULLCA permits the reduction
but not the elimination of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, 6 while
the Delaware LLC Act (DLLCA) allows all fiduciary duties to be elimi-
nated by contract.7 Until fairly recently, the debate about the wisdom of
complete contractual flexibility was centered on privately-held LLCs.
Of late, a handful of LLCs have gone public,8 thereby changing the
dimensions of the debate regarding complete contractual freedom. This
debate is, no doubt, further framed by the fact that Delaware corpora-
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. A.B., Vassar
College, 1972; J.D., Yale University, 1975. The author thanks Shayna Gilmore and Addison
Pierce, both J.D. 2015, Washington College of Law, for their invaluable help.
1. Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are The New King Of The Hill: An Empirical Study
Of The Number Of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Be-
tween 2004-2007 And How LLCs Were Taxed For Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459-60, 468-85 (2010) ("[Tjhe limited liability company ... is now
undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in the United States.").
2. Id. at 466, 485.
3. Winnifred A. Lewis, Note, Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited Partner-
ships and Limited Liability Companies, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 1017, 1020 n.31 (2013).
4. Id. at n.32 (noting that in Delaware in 2011, three times as many LLCs were
formed than were corporations).
5. See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (2006).
6. Id. § 105(d)(1).
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (West 2015). Delaware's default rule is that
LLC managers owe fiduciary duties. Id. § 18-1104.
8. As of September 2013, there were 20 publicly-traded LLCs. Suren Gomtsian, The
Governance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability Companies 9 (Tilberg Law and Econom-
ics Center, Discussion Paper No. 2014-008, 2014). While many of the issues involving Dela-
ware LLCs are also true for Delaware Limited Partnerships (LPs), structural differences
affecting unitholder voting rights and stock exchange rules make it unwise to group LPs
and LLCs together. See Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, MLP PRIMER 20 (5th ed. 2013); see




tions lack the option to eliminate fiduciary duties.9 As such, Delaware
LLCs may now trade publicly without their managers owing any fiduciary
duties, while their counterparts, publicly-traded corporations, may not.
After briefly summarizing in Part I the debate involving private LLCs
without fiduciary duties and corporations with fiduciary duties, Part II
will explore both private responses and regulatory systems that provide
oversight of public entities. The Article concludes that an investment in a
publicly-traded Delaware LLC is neither irrational nor unprotected de-
spite the entity's total contractual freedom.
I. PART I: SETTING THE STAGE
A. PRIVATE LLCs WITHOUT FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Different views exist regarding the DLLCA's permissive treatment of
fiduciary duties. A primary argument in support of this permissiveness is
that LLCs are a nexus of contracts, and contract law does not impose
fiduciary duties.'0 One article cogently summarized other arguments sup-
porting complete contractual flexibility:
Foremost, in an entity context, "freedom of contract" signifies to a
reviewing court that a Delaware LLC is a bargained-for, contractual
entity where terms are not uniformly set by statute, but rather terms
are dictated by the parties and the marketplace. ... Second, freedom
of contract also represents that parties may bargain in self-interest or
freely waive self-interest, if desired. Third, contractual freedom...
most importantly permits parties to determine for themselves
whether to contract or to walk away from the bargaining table due to
unfair or untenable terms.11
Furthermore, elimination of fiduciary duties concomitantly eliminates
the risk imposed by unforeseen judicial applications of these duties and
instead allows for substitution of specific conduct that is contractually
mandated.' 2 Professor Johnson summarized additional, less tangible, rea-
sons regarding why investors might rationally make this choice:
Many investors may completely understand, reasonably foresee, and
yet still be willing to bear, the risks associated with blanket waivers.
They may believe that a manager's past performance, desire to pro-
tect and enhance his or her reputation, need to access capital mar-
kets in the future . . . all coalesce to provide sufficient safeguards
against truly egregious misconduct. There is, consequently, a respect-
9. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Delaware's Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REv. 701,
721 (2011) (noting that even Delaware statutory close corporations, which offer great con-
tractual freedom, cannot contract away fiduciary duties).
10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); U.C.C. § 1-203
(2004).
11. Ann E. Conaway & Peter I. Tsoflias, Challenging Traditional Thought: No Default
Fiduciary Duties in DE LLCs After Augira, 13 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 1, 6 (2012); see also id. at
12 (noting that imposition of fiduciary duties "counteracts free will and the parties' ability
to tailor their deals according to specific desires, businesses, internal operations, and niche
ventures, including self-dealing transactions[ ]").
12. Lewis, supra note 3, at 1049.
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able policy case to be made for permitting broad fiduciary duty waiv-
ers ex ante.
13
Finally, the lack of fiduciary duties does not mean that investors are help-
less against unacceptable behavior; they may utilize the array of contract
remedies, including the covenant of good faith.
14
Opponents of this permissiveness argue that public policy mandates fi-
duciary duties in all business associations because one party has control
over another's property.' 5 As Professor Kleinberger argued: "To . . . up-
root fiduciary duty ... involves a sea of change in: (i) how the law ap-
proaches the risks that inherently exist in people entrusting their property
... into management ... and (ii) what the law believes possible of con-
tract drafters. '16 Opponents further claim that fiduciary duties are
founded in equity, not in contract law. 17
Moreover, opponents argue that the contractarian view is premised on
an idealistic and unrealistic view of how an LLC and the governing con-
tract are formed.' 8 Opponents further contend that mandatory fiduciary
duties decrease transaction costs in the drafting process as parties need
not draft for every contingency.' 9 Finally, opponents contend that fiduci-
ary duties are the best way to control management misconduct. 20 Even if
investors agree to eliminate fiduciary duties, they do not "bargain for
betrayal.•"21
While the DLLCA departs from the ULLCA in permitting the elimina-
13. Johnson, supra note 9, at 721 (internal quotations omitted).
14. Conaway & Tsoflias, supra note 11, at 14 (listing reformation of the contract, the
doctrine of unconscionability, failure of assent, interpreting terms against the drafter, adhe-
sion contracts, frustration of purpose, and intentional breach of contract to terminate an
unsatisfactory contract); Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of Free-
dom to Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware's General
Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 807 (2008) (reasoning that the duty of good
faith is the linchpin to the integrity of the contractarian argument); see also infra notes
23-27 and accompanying text (discussing reach of the covenant of good faith).
15. Johnson, supra note 9, at 712 (citing Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. Dorsey & Whitney,
LLP, C.A. No. 3874-VCS, 2009 WL 2501542, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2009) ("[t]he hallmark
of a fiduciary relationship is that one person has the power to exercise control over the
property of another")); In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, C.A. No. 4589 VCN, 2010 WL
4273122, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010) (due to policy concerns regarding entrusting prop-
erty to another, courts will assume LLCs have fiduciary duties unless there is explicit lan-
guage eliminating them).
16. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of "Alternative Entities": From Tax Rationali-
zation Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FoDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445,
471 (2008); see also Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC
Manager After More than a Decade of Experimentation, 32 J. CORP. L. 565, 603 (2007)
(arguing for a system that permits some modification, but not the elimination of the fiduci-
ary duty of loyalty).
17. Lewis, supra note 3, at 1044.
18. Johnson, supra note 9, at 722 ("There are well-recognized shortcomings with much
ex ante bargaining. These include lack of sophistication, high initial trust, difficulties of
foreseeing opportunism, hesitancy to raise concerns about suspicions, and understandable
concerns about creating hard feelings at the outset of a rosy business relationship.").
19. Lewis, supra note 3, at 1045.
20. Id. at 1044.
21. Johnson, supra note 9, at 722.
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tion of all fiduciary duties,2 2 these two statutes agree that good faith will
not constitute a fiduciary duty, as it is in corporate law, 23 but will instead
be a covenant that cannot be eliminated. 24 There is ample caselaw25 and
scholarly literature 26 delineating the parameters of this covenant, explain-
ing that the covenant can be used only to interpret contract provisions,
rather than to supply new terms. As such, there is no dispute that the
covenant of good faith is neither broad-based nor equivalent to a fiduci-
ary duty.2 7
B. MANDATORY FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN CORPORATIONS
While many aspects of Delaware corporate law offer corporations and
stockholders contractual freedom,28 the corporate contract fundamen-
tally differs from the DLLCA because Delaware corporations lack the
option to eliminate fiduciary duties.29 Thus, directors and officers30 of
Delaware corporations owe the corporation the fiduciary duties of care
and loyalty, with the latter including the fiduciary duty of good faith.31
Corporations may exculpate directors (but not officers) for breaches of
the duty of care,32 an option nearly universally chosen,33 but elimination
22. Supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
23. See infra text accompanying note 31.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (2011) (preventing agreement from limiting
or eliminating liability for bad faith violations of covenant of good faith and fair dealing);
UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. Acr § 110(c)(5) (2006) (prohibiting operating agreement from elimi-
nating the contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
25. See, e.g., Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Del. 2010) (explaining that
the covenant of good faith does not allow a party to rewrite a contract, but instead is only a
tool to interpret existing terms).
26. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of
Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 124 (2006) ("Under
freedom of contract principles, good faith functions as an interpretive doctrine, not as a
source of mandatory obligations.").
27. Stephen M. Bainbridge, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 79 (Foundation
Press, 1st ed. 2014) ("An implied covenant of good faith arises from the express terms of a
contract and is used to fulfill the parties' mutual intent. In contrast, a fiduciary duty has
little to do with the parties' intent ... a fiduciary duty requires the party subject to the duty
to put the interests of the beneficiary of the duty ahead of his own, while an implied duty
of good faith merely requires both parties to respect their bargain."); see also Johnson,
supra note 9, at 723 (noting that covenant of good faith provides little protection to inves-
tors); Auriga Cap. Corp. v. Gatz Prop., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 853 (Del. Ch. 2012), affd, 59
A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012) (noting the covenant of good faith "is not a tool ... to govern the
discretionary actions of business managers"). Contra Conaway, supra note 14, at 807 (rea-
soning that the duty of good faith is the linchpin to the integrity of the contractarian
argument).
28. Conaway, supra note 14, at 814 (delineating provisions of the Delaware corporate
statute that permit contractual flexibility).
29. Supra note 9.
30. Gantler v. Stevens, 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009) (holding that officers owe the
same fiduciary duties as do directors).
31. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (holding that good faith is a
subset of the fiduciary duty of loyalty).
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
33. See Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing Delaware's Broken Duty of
Care 4 (NYU Center for Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 09-41, 2009) ("All or
virtually all public Delaware companies have opted out of liability, making the possibility
[Vol. 68
Publicly- Traded LLCs
of the right to sue directors for a violation of the duty of care is not
equivalent to elimination of this fiduciary duty.34 Thus, in broad terms,
the major difference between a Delaware publicly-traded corporation
and a Delaware publicly-traded LLC is that directors of a corporation
owe a fiduciary duty of care that will likely be exculpated and fiduciary
duties of loyalty and good faith that cannot be exculpated, while LLCs
have the option to eliminate all fiduciary duties or to retain them and
provide limitations for any violation aside from the covenant of good
faith.
There are several rationales for imposing mandatory fiduciary duties in
corporations. First, the corporate statute is written for public corporations
where shareholders' lack of bargaining power makes them dependent on
corporate management to act in a manner that benefits investors.35 Sec-
ond, corporations tend to retain their earnings in order to become self-
sustaining after their initial stock offering; as a result, managers of corpo-
rations have control over vast sums of money with no mandate to declare
dividends to their shareholders. 36
Despite these reasons, the logic of mandatory corporate fiduciary du-
ties is easily questioned: why is it against public policy for a corporation
to operate without fiduciary duties if investors can achieve that goal
through forming an LLC instead of a corporation? Similarly, concerns
that investors lack bargaining power or need fiduciary protection from
overbearing managers cannot be limited to one business association ver-
sus another.
While responses to this obvious contradiction vary, 37 there is a strong
benefit to mandatory fiduciary duties in corporations: these duties are
part of the corporate "brand." Branding benefits potential investors who
need not investigate each investment for the existence and contours of
management's fiduciary duties. 38 As one article explained:
of money damages for violations of the duty of care effectively a dead letter .... ); John C.
Kairis, DISGORGEMENT OF COMPENSATION PAID To DIRECTORS DURING THE TIME THEY
WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT: AN AVAILABLE BUT SELDOM USED REMEDY 3 (Grant &
Eisenhofer P.A. 2011) (noting that nearly all Delaware public and Fortune 500 companies
adopted exculpation provisions).
34. Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 664 (Del. Ch. 2012) ("By limiting or elimi-
nating the prospect of liability but leaving in place the duty itself, [such] a provision...
restricts the remedies that a party.. . can seek. Monetary liability may be out, but injunc-
tive relief, a decree of specific performance, rescission, the imposition of a constructive
trust, and a myriad of other non-liability-based remedies remain in play.").
35. Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminancy, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 131, 142-43 (2009) ("[C]orporations need fiduciary duties.., to address the mis-
alignment of managers' incentives with those of their owners.").
36. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 29 ("The practice of paying high dividends did not
allow [the LLC to] retain[ I earnings and accumulate[] cash similar to corporations.").
37. While some would respond to this contradiction by reasoning that all business as-
sociations should have mandatory fiduciary duties, see supra note 15 and accompanying
text, LLCs' and corporations' different financing methods provide a plausible rationale for
different fiduciary needs. See supra text accompanying note 36.
38. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1678 (1989) ("[S]tandardization of contract
terms through the use of mandatory legal rules reduces information costs for investors.").
20151
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Merely by branding itself as a Delaware corporation, a firm can sig-
nal easily that it has certain core characteristics that provide basic
protections to investors. Anyone contemplating buying shares of
stock in a Delaware corporation can be confident, without having to
obtain and examine the certificate of incorporation, that the direc-
tors ... will be subject to a duty of loyalty .... By contrast, anyone
contemplating buying interests in a limited liability company ... can
have no such confidence without carefully examining the governing
agreement. Thus, if the core characteristics of the corporate form
were not mandatory, the signaling value of the brand would be lost.39
Based on the commanding position Delaware holds as the leading state
for incorporation for publicly-held companies,40 there is little incentive
for Delaware to change its corporate brand.
II. PART II: THE NEW PLAYER: PUBLIC LLCS WITHOUT
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The advent of Delaware publicly-traded LLCs without fiduciary duties
has not yet generated headlines. While the Delaware Supreme Court has
upheld this waiver of fiduciary duties in publicly-traded LLC's without
much fanfare,41 Vice Chancellor Noble noted, perhaps reluctantly, that
publicly-traded entities that lack fiduciary duties may "permit self-dealing
transactions... with almost no oversight by this Court.... The General
Assembly has decided that this Court has only a limited role in protecting
the investors ... and that is a role this Court must accept. '42
Early on, some academics raised alarms about the potential dangers of
complete contractual freedom when business associations go public. Sev-
eral scholars-although focused on both publicly-traded Limited Partner-
ships as well as LLCs-concluded that minority owners are vulnerable to
abuse.43 These articles expressed concern that non-corporate business as-
sociations did not offer rights or benefits to minority owners to offset the
39. Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 845, 847 (2008).
40. "More than 50% of all publicly-traded companies in the United States including
65% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as their legal home." See About Agency,
DELAWARE.GOV, http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
41. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (reviewing the case de novo but
accepting without any review the publicly-traded LLC's right to waive all fiduciary duties).
42. Gerber v. Enter. Prod. Holdings, LLC, CA No 5989-VCN, 2012 WL 34442, at *10
n.42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2012).
43. Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law:
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CoRP. L. 555, 558 (2012) (cautioning
that LPs and LLCs either waived fiduciary duties or exculpated managers without counter-
vailing mechanisms to protect minority investors); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic,
The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 924 (2012) (concluding that LLC agreements
eliminated managers' liabilities while owners lacked buyout rights); see also Lawrence A.
Hamermesh & Ruby R. Vale, The "Outer Reaches" of Allowable Conduct? Or "You Ain't






dominant rights granted to the majority owners and the elimination of
fiduciary duties.44  Similarly, Professor Horton concluded that
noncorporate investors face higher risks of being squeezed out than do
their corporate counterparts. 45
With these warnings, why would investors choose to invest in publicly-
traded LLCs? The reasons are varied: private-ordering responses; the
regulatory system in which any publicly-traded entity operates; and con-
cerns about corporate fiduciary duties.
A. PRIVATE-ORDERING RESPONSES
If one drills down on the early conclusion that investors in publicly-
traded LLCs are vulnerable due to the LLC's contractual freedom, much
of these concerns evaporate by examining the LLCs' response to this
freedom. When Professor Gomtsian conducted the most recent study of
publicly-traded LLCs to ascertain whether "the founding and controlling
members use the statutory default rules to create governance structures
that entrench their control, limit their accountability or are potentially
oppressive towards outside investors in any other way," 46 his answer was
no.
4 7
First, although LLCs can eliminate all fiduciary duties, Gomtsian re-
ported that only three of the twenty publicly-traded LLCs had done so
for managers.48 Gomtsian also reported that while all twenty had pro-
vided for some exculpation from liability, only one LLC exculpated for
all types of violations. 49 The other nineteen LLCs all exculpated for
breaches of the duty of care;50 various LLCs excepted from exculpation
violations of the duty of loyalty, acts in bad faith, and/or knowing viola-
tions of the law,51 and sixteen LLCs created conflict-of-interest rules for
managers. 52 While Delaware permits only corporate directors to be ex-
culpated, 53 sixteen LLCs exculpated officers as well.54 In sum, as the vast
majority of LLCs did not use their contractual freedom either to elimi-
nate fiduciary duties or to provide total exculpation, the primary differ-
ence from corporations was that LLCs extended exculpation to officers.
44. See, e.g., Manesh, supra note 43, at 596-97.
45. Brent J. Horton, The Going-Private Freeze-Out: A Unique Danger for Investors in
Delaware Non-Corporate Business Associations, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 53, 61 (2013) (con-
cluding 58.82% of LLCs agreements and 94.2% of LP agreements create higher risks for
investors being frozen out than are corporate shareholders because managers of these non-
public, non-corporate entities lack fiduciary duties).
46. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 2.
47. Id. at 28.
48. Id. at 14; see also Manesh, supra note 43, at 604-13 app. B (reporting that four of
the twelve publicly-traded LLCs as of 2011 had waived all fiduciary duties).
49. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 14-15.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 39.
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011) (permitting exculpation for directors
but not for officers).
54. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 39.
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Second, while fiduciary duties and exculpation form the nucleus of gov-
ernance concerns, corollary management issues also exist. Specifically,
LLCs could use their contractual freedom to entrench management's
control to the detriment of investors. Gomtsian reported that 65% of the
listed LLCs had strong management control rights.55 In order to disci-
pline management, however, 45% committed to mandatory quarterly dis-
tributions 56 and 80% regularly declared dividends. 57 As Professor
Gomtsian reasoned:
[D]ividend payment obligations and practices are an important ele-
ment in the governance structure of publicly traded LLCs and are
used to mitigate the conflicts of interests between controlling mem-
bers and outside investors. The large share of cash payments to LLC
members limits the discretion of the managers and controlling mem-
bers, while high dividend incomes compensate outside investors for
poor corporate governance practices. 58
Moreover, frequent dividend declarations create another ancillary
monitor: LLCs must return to the capital markets to replenish their
funds.59 Success in raising capital necessitates an investor-friendly reputa-
tion sufficient to offset risks created by the LLC's governance structure.60
One author synthesized well the connection between governance and
capital: "[p]ass-through businesses have to be far more intertwined with
investors. Staying alive means routinely inhaling capital, as well as
exhaling. ' '61
Finally, in response to Professor Horton's conclusion that minority
shareholders in publicly-traded LLCs face higher freeze-out risks when
managers have eliminated fiduciary duties,62 the short answer is that only
55. Id. at 4, 9-10 (delineating control devices, such as contracts to appoint the majority
of the directors, limiting the right to remove directors, or requiring supermajority voting).
56. Id. at 40; see also Manesh, supra note 43, at 614 app. C (specifying that five of
twelve listed LLCs mandated distributions of all profits).
57. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 23 (reporting that only four LLCs regularly retained
earnings).
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id. 26-28 (noting that public LLCs must continuously access capital); Manesh,
supra note 43, at 565 (linking distributions with returning to the markets to raise additional
funds); Larry E. Ribstein, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 209 (2010) (finding that
mandatory distributions force LLCs to turn to the market for new funding); see also Larry
E. Ribstein The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 140
(2009) (framing required distributions as owners' most important right due to the resulting
exposure to capital markets); John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60
Bus. LAW. 471 (2005) (discussing systemic reliance on capital markets for entities with
mandatory distributions); cf. Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, supra note 8, at 11 (attributing
growth in the offerings of MLPs, including listed LLCs and LPs, in part to "distribut[ions
of] the majority of their cash flow[ ]").
60. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 26; see also id. at 28 ("Ownership and capital structures
were actively used by listed LLCs to mitigate adverse selection, moral hazard and agency
issues, and make the public offering of shares representing LLC interests attractive for
outside investors.").
61. The Rise of the Distorporation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2013.
62. Horton, supra note 45, at 61.
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three of twenty LLCs totally eliminated fiduciary duties. 63 Nevertheless,
Professor Horton's concern remains, given that none of the LLCs pro-
vided appraisal rights to dissenting owners,64 and six used their contrac-
tual freedom to lower slightly the percentage of stock that must be owned
under Delaware corporate law in order to squeeze out minority owners
without a stockholder vote.65 These concerns dissipate, however, because
the high cost of the appraisal remedy limits its usefulness, 66 and the
choice of only six LLCs to lower slightly the squeeze-out percentage is
not significant. As a result, Gomtsian concluded: "contractual freedom
.. contrary to the expectations, has not led to an extensive lowering of
the bar in the protection of the rights of investors in financial markets.' 67
Furthermore, minority investors receive some protection from the securi-
ties laws' going-private rules.68
B. THE REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR PUBLICLY-TRADED ENTITIES
Even if a listed LLC lacks fiduciary duties, its managers are not unreg-
ulated. Publicly-traded entities operate under layers of oversight that do
not apply to private entities. Specifically, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act) and the stock exchanges each impose governance rules,
and the stock market will mete out some degree of discipline.
The hallmark of securities regulation is mandated disclosure of all ma-
terial facts. While not all public entities have identical disclosure obliga-
tions,69 an LLC's registration statement will disclose the lack of fiduciary
duties.70 Thereafter, certain '34 Act rules apply to all public entities.
71
63. Supra text accompanying note 48.
64. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 12.
65. Id. (stating that six LLCs provided squeeze-out rights when a member owned
more than 80% of the voting rights). In contrast, under Delaware corporate law, a share-
holder must own 90% of the voting stock to effectuate a squeeze-out. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8 § 253 (2011).
66. Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 79, 82 (1995) (discussing the high cost of exercising appraisal rights).
67. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 28. But see Manesh, supra note 43, at 596 (concluding
that LLC managers have used their contractual freedom without corresponding checks or
incentives to discipline management).
68. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a)-(c) (2011) (permitting Emerging Growth
Companies (ECGs) to phase into executive compensation and financial disclosures, as well
as into new accounting standards); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), (d), (e), 78n(a), (c), (d), (f), 78p(a)
(2012) (limiting §§ 13, 14 and 16 to § 12(g) companies, thereby exempting § 15(d) filers
from these requirements).
70. Given that the definition of a material fact is what "would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information availa-
ble," TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), the elimination of fiduci-
ary duties would be deemed material. A registration statement must disclose all material
facts. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2012) (listing required information to be disclosed in a registra-
tion statement).
71. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (requiring exchanges to mandate an independent
audit committee for all listed companies); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2003) (requiring annual
reports from §§ 12(b) and 12(g) filers); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(c) (2003) (requiring certifi-
cations of annual reports for §§ 12(b) and 12(g) filers); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-1 (requiring
2015]
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Moreover, additional rules for listed LLCs72 will apply.73 Among these
myriad rules are some that relate to governance, such as disclosure of
executive compensation,74 and mandated certifications attesting to the
veracity of various financial reports.
75
The '34 Act's going-private rule best demonstrates how disclosure may
constrain management's behavior.76 Under Delaware law, those in con-
trol must provide both fair dealing and a fair price to minority sharehold-
ers in a going-private transaction.77 Similarly, the '34 Act's going-private
rule requires the issuer to respond to questions about its going private
process;78 since an issuer might be embarrassed responding that it had not
taken steps to assure fairness, the disclosure rules "persuade" the issuer
to commit to a process likely to offer fair dealing and a fair price.
Stock exchange listing requirements also provide mechanisms to moni-
tor management's conduct. The New York Stock Exchange, for example,
imposes on all listed entities certain core governance standards, 79 such as
maintaining an audit committee and disclosing governance standards, but
allows some entities, including qualified LLCs, 80 to claim exemptions
from other standards. While not a quid pro quo for fiduciary regulation,
annual reports from § 15(d) filers); 17 C.F.R. § 240-15d-14(c) (2003) (requiring certifica-
tions of annual reports for § 15(d) filers).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (requiring registration if an issuer lists a class of securities
on a national securities exchange); cf supra note 69 (noting ECGs are given more time to
phase into some reporting requirements); see also 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(a)-(b) (requiring
under § 12(g) entities that have "total assets exceeding $10,000,000 and a class of equity
securities... held of record by either 2,000 persons, or 500 persons who are not accredited
investors" to comply with all rules of the '34 Act, although ECGs are given more time to
phase into some requirements; supra note 69 (discussing ECGs).
73. Since the twenty LLCs discussed in this article are publicly-traded, Gomtsian,
supra note 8, at 9, all will be subject to section 12(b) registration requirements. See supra
note 72.
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2011) (requiring §§ 12(b), 12(g) and 15(d) filers to
comply with "say-on-pay" rule).
75. See 17 C.F.R. § 240-13a-14 (2003) (requiring §§ 12(b), 12(g) and 15(d) filers to
provide CEO and CFO certifications).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012) (limiting requirements for going-private transactions to
§§ 12(b) & 12(g) companies).
77. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (explaining that fair deal-
ing concerns timing, structure and negotiations, and fair price concerns all relevant eco-
nomic factors).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014(a), (c)-(d) (1979) (mandating disclosure of whether issuer
"reasonably believes that the ... transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security hold-
ers," including specifying whether a majority of unaffiliated shareholders approved, and
whether unaffiliated directors negotiated on behalf of minority shareholders).
79. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 8 (requiring that all listed compa-
nies comply with § 303A.00, but only certain provisions are mandatory for all listed
entities).
80. A qualified LLC must either be a "Controlled Company," where 50% of the vot-
ing power for the election of directors is held by an individual, a group, or another com-
pany, or the LLC lists preferred or debt securities on the exchange. See NYSE Listed
Company Manual, supra note 8 (specifying exemptions for "Preferred and Debt Listing"
and for "Controlled Companies"). Since the majority of the twenty publicly-listed LLCs in
2012 employed mechanisms to control the board, Gomtsian supra note 8, at 9-10, the ma-
jority of LLCs would likely qualify as "Controlled Companies."
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listing requirements provide a structure for good management.81
Finally, the stock market provides some oversight of management's
conduct. If the LLC trades in an efficient market,82 the market's response
to management's misconduct will lower the price of the LLC interests. 83
A lower price not only hurts management whose compensation may be
tied to stock prices, but also may invite unwanted takeover bids.84 While
it is more likely that the LLC will trade in an inefficient market, 85 even
this scenario will mete out some degree of discipline as inefficient mar-
kets still respond to material information.86 Furthermore, as discussed
above,87 since LLCs commonly distribute income to their owners and
therefore must continuously return to the capital markets, success in sub-
sequent efforts to raise capital will require managers to have established
an investor-friendly reputation: "market disciplining strongly, perhaps
stronger than in listed corporations... influences the governance of pub-
licly traded LLCs. ' '88
C. REFLECTIONS ON CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
As noted above,89 fiduciary duties are endemic to corporations. The
reasons for mandatory fiduciary duties vary, but the corporate financial
model of retaining substantial portions of earnings90 results in huge pools
of capital that would raise concerns if managers who oversaw these pools
lacked fiduciary duties. In other words, the corporate financial model ne-
cessitates accountability that is served, at least partially, by mandatory
fiduciary duties. Since listed LLCs work from a different financial model,
there is reason to question whether fiduciary duties are necessary for
both models.
81. See, e.g., NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 8, which requires a majority
of independent directors, § 303A.01, a nominating/corporate governance committee com-
posed entirely of independent directors, § 303A.04, and a compensation committee com-
posed entirely of independent directors, § 303A.05, but allows exemptions that many LLCs
would meet, § 303A.00. Despite the availability of an exemption, many qualified LLCs
voluntarily complied with most or all standards. See Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 25.
82. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1270, 1276 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting Harman
v. Lymphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.N.I1l 1988)) (defining efficient market as open,
i.e., a large number of shares can be purchased and sold, and developed, i.e., a high level of
trading activity, where "material information on the company is widely available and accu-
rately reflected in the value of the stock[ I").
83. Id. at 1286-87 (describing an efficient market as reporting immediate movement of
stock prices after unexpected corporate events or financial releases).
84. Conaway, supra note 14, at 805 (correlating poor governance to lower stock prices,
thereby rendering entity vulnerable to hostile takeovers).
85. LLCs typically trade in an inefficient market because of their concentration of
ownership, limited floats and low levels of trading activity. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 32;
see supra note 82 (defining efficient market).
86. Bradford Cornell, Market Efficiency and Securities Litigation: Implications of the
Appellate Decision in Thane, 6 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 237, 251 (2011) (finding that inefficient
markets react to important information).
87. Supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
88. Gomtsian, supra note 8, at 26.
89. Supra text accompanying note 9.
90. Supra text accompanying note 36.
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Moreover, the frequency of litigation over fiduciary duties in corporate
deals is breathtaking. One article reported:
Multiple teams of plaintiffs file lawsuits challenge virtually every
public company merger. . .. In 2012, 93% of deals over $100 million
and 96% of deals over $500 million were challenged .... In 2013...
97.5% of deals over $100 million were challenged ... and each trans-
action triggered an average of seven separate lawsuits. 91
Not only do other scholars reporting similarly-staggering statistics,92 but
one article reported that "merits count for little in the decision to bring a
fiduciary suit .. . . 93 Therefore, investors may rationally believe that an
LLC without fiduciary duties will attract less risk-averse managers who
will govern without fear of nuisance litigation. Investors can further capi-
talize on this logic by using the LLC's contractual flexibility to shield both
officers and directors. 94
III. CONCLUSION
The Delaware legislature has offered an array of limited liability busi-
ness associations. The substantial differences between LLCs and their
corporate counterparts, particularly on the freedom to eliminate fiduciary
duties, should not cast LLCs either as predatory or as harbingers of a
better business association. LLCs simply depart from corporate norms.
Equally valid is that investors who choose to buy into listed Delaware
LLCs are not unprotected. The choice of only three listed LLCs to elimi-
nate fiduciary duties suggests that entrepreneurs believe fiduciary duties
are necessary to attract investors. Moreover, even if an LLC eliminates
fiduciary duties or expands exculpation coverage, securities and stock ex-
change rules provide their own monitors. Finally, regardless of the degree
of efficiency of the market in which the LLC trades, the market provides
added protection for investors.
Nor can investors of listed Delaware LLCs be deemed irrational. It is
not surprising that investors and managers view corporate litigation wa-
rily, and seek a different model.95 Moreover, when one compares public
LLCs and public corporations, one factor dominates: LLC owners have
received "double or triple the market average" in dividends. 96 Although
91. Steven Davidoff Solomon, et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform 2 n.6 (U. Penn. Inst.
For Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 14-4, 2014).
92. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in
2013 (Ohio State Pub. Law Working Paper No. 236, 2014, available at http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2377001 (showing takeover litigation in 98% of deals in 2013).
93. Minor Myers & Charles Korsmo, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When
Do The Merits Matter?, 75 OHIo STATE L.J. 829 (2014).
94. See supra text accompanying note 32 (specifying that Delaware corporations can
exculpate directors but not officers).
95. Cf. The Rise of the Distorporation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2013 (noting that non-
corporate entities give management greater flexibility in structuring transactions).
96. Id.; see also Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, supra note 8, at 11 (comparing median
yields of 6.5% in MLPs, which includes listed LLCs, to S&P 500 yields of 2%).
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no study has differentiated financial returns based on whether the LLC
maintained or eliminated fiduciary duties, the most recent study showing
that only three of twenty publicly-traded LLCs had eliminated fiduciary
duties suggests little correlation.
The point is not that monitors or distributions replicate the benefits of
fiduciary duties. Instead, the point is that investors appear to be compen-
sated for their risks, and those risks are further mitigated by private or-
dering, federal regulation, and the stock market. Thus, the contractual
freedom afforded publicly-traded LLCs allows investors to calibrate their
investment vehicle to their preference for risk and return.
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